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LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMINAL AOTS
ALBERT K STEBBINS

In the last few years we seem to have been afflicted by a
large and increasing number of unnatural and revolting crimes,
the details of which, as flaunted before the public by the sensational press, have shocked society. Many ignorant persons have
clamored for lynching; the law has demanded full retribution
in the regular course; while many learned individuals have asserted, and some have testified, that such actors should be relieved
from the penalties imposed by law, for the apparent reason that
they were doing the best they could, that angels could do no more,
and, although not asserting they were within the angelic category, if that best was the commission of heinous crimes the law
should not punish, even though the actor was keenly and often
super-intelligently conscious of the fact that he was breaking the
law and subjecting himself to its penalties. To phrase it differently, if an act was the seemingly inevitable result of heredity, environment or history--one or all-the actor should not be
held to be legally responsible, however conscious he may have
been of the fact that he was breaking the law and of the difference between right and wrong .
At the Buffalo meeting of the American Bar Association
last August, Dr. William A. White, of Washington, D. C., admirably stated the foregoing theory in an address before the section on Criminology relative to what he considered to be the
misconceptions of the law concerning mental disease in connection
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class, and his conclusions are entitled to respectful consideration,
but his theories, judged by all rules of social necessity, seem to
pass beyond the non-moral almost to the point of an intellectual
immorality. He objects to the customary tests of the law as being
antiquated and, from the scientific point of view, he considers
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questions relative to the actor's sense of responsibility or
ability to distinguish between right and wrong as being almost

humorous.

The gist of the objection is to be found in the fol-

lowing quotation from his address:
"The common factor that runs through the whole problem of crime and its various manifestations is the psychology
of the individual offender, and the law, with its emphasis
upon the act rather than the actor, he feels has failed to give
this factor adequate consideration."

The statement is doubtless correct from the psychiatrists' point
of view, and "that factor" must be given full consideration in the
treatment of the actor in a psychopathic ward, but cannot be
given the emphasis which the doctor desires when a person guilty
of a criminal act stands before the bar of justice to receive the
judgment of organized society. To give the indicated effect to
the "psychology of the individual" is merely to excuse the offender for his act because of heredity, history or environment,
although he may be fully conscious of the fact that his act offends against the law, and is contrary to accepted notions of right
and wrong. The doctor's test confuses moral responsibility with
legal responsibility; the former may be applied by God when the
actor is judged before a Heavenly Tribunal, but cannot safely
be applied by man in the regulation of human society.
This attack upon the established rules of law has a real and
present importance for the reason that it is the exact claim
which has been advanced as an excuse for the commission of
some of the most atrocious of recent crimes, and in one of the
most notorious cases has received favorable consideration by the
trial judge.
As a problem in ethics, it is always interesting to apply this
test; admitting a conscious breach of the law, to what extent is
this murderer, burglar or forger morally guilty? We may state
at the start that without a predisposing heredity, or a preparatory
history and environment, with the natural psychic processes resulting therefrom, no man passes from a consistently virtuous life
to crime. The moral and conventional restraints of society must,
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in some way, be broken down before, to paraphrase "The Pirates
of Penzance," the enterprising burglar goes a-burgling or the
criminal becomes occupied with crime. There is a psychic history, be it short or long, which precedes the commission of every
crime and which may excuse in morals but which the safety of
society demands must not be recognized at law. This is unfortunate, but there are many unfortunate psychic factors at work
in civilization, not the least of which is that known to the law
as criminal intent. "Sals populi lex supremac est" must be applied as the rule-the formal expression of that which results in
the greatest good for the greatest number.
Probably the experience of every lawyer whose practice has
extended over a considerable period of years, negatives the propriety of recognizing the "psychology of the individual" as an
indulgence for crime unless or until it passes beyond the bounds
of that sanity which is able to distinguish between right and
wrong. It is difficult to ascertain the psychic processes of the
individual accused of crime who denies the commission of the
alleged act. In spite of what appears to be overwhelming evidence, and in the face of a verdict of guilty, there is always the
possibility that the individual-man or woman-is telling the
truth and is absolutely innocent. This is one of the chief arguments against capital punishment and is another thing which God
only knows-as in the case of Sacco and Vanzetti. However,
with the man who confesses his guilt to his lawyer, if to no one
else, whether in civil or criminal cases, an entirely different situation arises. The majority of persons accused of wrongdoing
will, in confidence, confess the act. Most of these, but far from
all of them, with retribution impending, will be' sorry that they
committed that particular act. It is nevertheless most unusual,
almost unknown, to find such a one without an excuse which
absolves him or her from all moral guilt, and the more seemingly
inexcusable the act the more inclined are they to defend its commission as either morally right or justifiable. That is a form of
the "psychology of the individual" which, in the absence of that
insanity known to the law, as such, falls very far from relieving
the actor from legal responsibility for his act. Some cases of
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this kind are simple, and even a learned psychiatrist would not
attempt to relieve the actor from legal responsibility, but basically
the excuses are all the same; that is, a reason which satisfies the
conscience of the actor in knowingly breaking the law and,
phrase it as one may, that is the very psychic state, glossed or
unglossed, which the psychiatrists assert as a sufficient cause for
relieving from the penalties of guilt.
Let me refer to three situations which occur to me out of
recent practice.
In the first, a witness during the course of a trial denied
repeatedly the existence of a particular act. This fact, although
of materiality under the rules of evidence, could not actually have
any bearing upon the result of the trial and was of itself perfectly
innocent. The situation was a peculiar one, and, in the heat of
the trial, I assumed that the witness was being "framed" in an
inconsequential matter, for jury effect, and I was properly indignant. Later, the witness came to me and stated that a foreign
attorney, on whose integrity and judgment the witness relied, had
advised, long before the trial, that if the particular question was
asked he was to deny the existence of the fact because, although
the fact existed, it was "none of the business" of the other side.
Here we have a person of little experience and fair intelligence
who relied upon a person of large experience and superior understanding. The "psychology of the individual" in this case was
such that there was doubtless absolutely no moral guilt, but the
law certainly could not recognize that excuse in a prosecution for
perjury.
Take another situation in which the psychic factors are
somewhat more complicated. Two cases arose which were practically identical, each involving a trusted employe of a large
corporation. The individuals were working upon small salaries
but handled large sums of money. In the first instance, they
were thoroughly honest-so far as that could be learned. The
officers of the corporation were lax in attending to business, lived
extravagantly, and used large sums of money for their families,
the source of which was not known to the employes. This was
the subject of brooding, and a sense of personal wrong, coupled
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with a suspicion of the integrity of their superiors, arose. First
a few dollars were taken for what seemed to be necessities; this
was repaid and conscience salved itself; more money was
taken-first for relative necessities, then for simple amusements,
finally for gross extravagance and dissipation. The individuals
were hard-working, and inclined to be loyal to their families, and
when the defalcations, amounting to several thousand dollars,
were discovered the "psychology of the individuals" had reached
a point where, although unquestionably able to distinguish between right and wrong, they were seemingly convinced that the
surrounding circumstances absolved them from all moral guilt,
and they were vigorous in defending what they had done, from
the moral point of view, while fully conscious at all times that
they were breaking the law.
We will now take a longer jump. An illegitimate boy,
raised in an asylum with a severe regimen, was, upon leaving,
soon committed to an industrial school for some trifling offense.
Conviction followed conviction; as soon as he was released from
one penal institution, he was under suspicion and promptly sent
to another. Sometimes offenses for which he was not responsible
were shifted to him as a likely subject. He served time when he
was guilty and when he was not guilty. At the age of thirtyeight he had been an inmate of penal or quasi-penal institutions
three-quarters of his life. He was convinced that he was persecuted, that the hand of society was against him, and he fought
back as a weakling against a powerful foe. Caught in the act
of passing one-dollar bills which had been raised to high denominations, he was convinced that he was right, although judged by
accepted legal standards he was quite able to distinguish between
right and wrong, and he knew that he was breaking the law, but
it was the law enacted by his enemy. He was arraigned before a
kindly and experienced United States District Judge. The
United States Attorney honestly believed that if he pleaded
guilty he would be treated with leniency, and so, unofficially, advised. He entered his plea and told his story. The reaction was
unexpected. The judge was of the opinion that imprisonment
for a long term would afford the sole means for reformation. A
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maximum sentence was imposed, and then, off the record, the
judge spoke kindly, as man to man-he knew the officer in charge
of this Federal prison, he was a high-type man, he would be a
friend to the unfortunate one and teach him that society was not
his enemy. The judge went further-if at the end of two years
the prisoner would write to him that his point of view had
changed the judge would investigate and, if true, he would personally recommend and insist upon a pardon. The man went to
prison. Within six months the kindly judge died. Shortly thereafter a new United States Attorney was named in that distiict,
then the war came, and every one forgot the unfortunate prisoner. He served his full term, and, at last accounts, was at large
more convinced than ever that so-called crime was nothing but
fighting his old-time enemy-society.
Here again the "psychology of the individual" justified the
crime in the eyes of the criminal; conscious of the difference between right and wrong, as such, his conscience, in his particular
activities, absolved him from moral guilt. He knew that he had
broken the law of his enemy, and that, in the opinion of that
enemy, he was guilty of a crime involving moral turpitude, for
he was really an intelligent person.
These are three simple cases, selected because they are typical
and quite devoid of sensationalism. The maudlin crimes, of an
almost unbelievable nature, with which the papers have been
recently filled, have purposely been excluded-they will at once occur to the reader and it is unnecessary to further perpetuate their
stories, but it may be said with confidence that in each case the
"psychology of the individual," as developed by the evidence, was
similar in form and identical in kind to the cases above noted.
What has the psychiatrist to suggest, either in the trial or the
punishment, or, if "punishment" be too crude a word, let us
say for the treatment of the actor and the protection of society?
This brings us directly to the question as to whether or not
legal responsibility and moral responsibility can, in any proper
sense, be treated as identical. The religions, the philosophies and
the laws of our Western Civilization are largely based upon the
doctrine of free will. In the religions, men are free to sin; in the
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philosophies, to err; in the laws, to commit wrong. For these
acts, the religions impose or believe in a spiritual sanction; the
philosophies a moral sanction, or, speaking as an evolutionist, the
penalties imposed in the struggle for existence and survival of the
fittest; the laws carry with them a social or legal sanction. The
religious sanction is that penalty which an omniscient being
determines for the purification of the Life Everlasting; the
philosophies know only a sanction which, as a result, necessarily
follows the weakness and failure of error, as such; but the laws
impose a sanction, primarily, for the protection and purification
of human society. The sanction of religion is postponed to some
time in the unknown future and rests with God; the sanction of
philosophy follows from the maladjustment of the individual in
his environment of time and space; but the sanction of the law
must be imposed by man, in the execution of man-made laws.
The sanction of religion is within the discretion of Omniscience;
the sanction of philosophy results from the seemingly uncertain
reaction of environment upon the individual in time; but the
sanction of the law must be relatively certain and immediate for
the protection of society.
As the purposes are different, so, it would seem, the degree
of responsibility may well be different. As the Omniscient, with
All Wisdom, may search souls, weighing and balancing impulses,
environments and opportunities; as the result of error is measured by the inexorable laws of life in the living and requires no
administration; so the sanction of the law must be applied to
men as judged by their acts, without the power to search the
soul for motives, other than those naturally drawn from the acts
themselves. To require society to delve into the uncertain domain
of heredity and find pre-natal impulses, to attempt to measure
the effect of generally unknown and always imponderable environment upon the actor, and then to strike a balance, as
Omniscience might be capable of doing, in order to determine
legal responsibility, is to identify legal responsibility with an
absolute moral responsibility and is requiring too much of human
society. It is true that there is a history to every act; that
from simple, and perhaps innocent beginnings, grave unsocial
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crimes result; that the crime and the history are in natural sequence, and that, in a sense, the criminal act is the direct result
of a self-created or otherwise imposed environment, but the law
cannot suspend its sanction or relieve from consequences unless
or until that history, passing through that environment, has so
shattered the mind of the actor that he is incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong.
The way of the psychiatrist is, however, different. He
would have the "psychology of the individual" be the prime
factor in the determination of legal guilt. If such "psychology
of the individual" is of a kind that classifies him as abnormal,
although there be no real disease of the mind, then it is asserted
he should not be held to legal responsibility, as an actor, for any
act traceable, academically, to that abnormality. The mere fact
that this presents an ethical, rather than a legal, problem fails to
deter the psychiatrist from insisting upon the rule as a measure
to be applied by human tribunals in the administration of the
law.
Now, although as a philosophic proposition there may be
such a concept as a "normal man," such a person is in fact merely
an imaginative composite; there is no such person. Hence, in a
sense, we are all abnormal-which the trained alienist will quite
readily admit-and this fact practically eliminates the question of
normalcy from practical, legal consideration. We may, however,
properly consider the "average man," in the sense that the "average man" has certain characteristics and principles which, for all
practical purposes, is what must be meant by "normal man," even
though the latter may have a proper place in psychology, as a
subject in a college curriculum.
One of the predominant characteristics of the average man,
in organized society, is his tendency to obey the law, both naturally and habitually. The average man has no inclination to
murder his closest family relations; nor has the average woman
the slightest inclination to insure her husband's life for the purpose of collecting the insurance by means of murder, so as to
elope with her paramour. The average 'college youth does not
respond to any stimuli which might prompt cutting little girls
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into pieces and delivering a parcel containing the remains to
the father of the child in exchange for money. The average high
school boy would abhor the thought of murdering in cold blood a
young companion for the purpose of analyzing the symptoms of
pain, both mental and physical, exhibited by the victim during the
process. Individuals who do commit such crimes depart so
completely from the course of the average man that they may
justly be termed "abnormal," for want of a better word, and it
is this which affords the psychiatrist his opening wedge in presenting his "psychology of the individual" to the courts as a reason for suspending the penalties of the law.
At this point it may be well to state the rule of law upon
the subject of legal responsibility. Courts differ upon the technical question of burden of proof on the issue of insanity, but
they generally agree upon the degree of insanity which will relieve the actor from legal responsibility for his acts. Perhaps
the rule has been as clearly stated by the English House of Lords
as by any other tribunal, and, as there stated, has been freely
adopted by the courts of America. For ready reference, we
may take this rule as quoted by the Supreme Court of Rhode
2
Island in the case of State v. Quigley:
"Every man is presumed to be sane and to possess a
sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crime,
until the contrary be proved to their (the jury's) satisfaction; that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the
act, the party was laboring under such a defect of reason
from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doing, or not to know that he was
doing wrong."
Somewhat in amplification of the above rule, the Supreme Court
of Alabama said, in McAllister v. State: 3
"The defense is not complete if at the time of the commission of the crime he (the defendant) had sufficient caR. I. 263, 58 AtI. 905 (1904).
3 17 Ala. 434 (i8o).
226
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pacity to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong,
to understand the nature and consequence of his act, and
mental power to apply that knowledge to his own case."
It would seem that the foregoing rules afforded all of the
protection required for any person charged with crime who, in
good faith, interposes a plea of insanity or offers evidence of insanity under a general plea of "not guilty." It would seem that
these rules were based upon that concept properly expressed
by the much-abused words "common sense," and that they certainly were tempered by the spirit of charity for the accused.
To this the psychiatrist replies, again quoting from Dr.
White's address:
"However much satisfaction may result from tracking
down an offender, identifying him, and bringing him to
trial, conviction and punishment, it is coming to be appreciated that the automatic carrying out of this sequence may
result in the most serious social consequences. Any one
brought intimately into the personal and family lives of individuals knows how much tragedy is brought to pass in the
name of Justice."
This well expresses a half-truth with which the courts have long
been confronted in the trial of criminal cases, visualized before
the jury by the sad-eyed, white-haired mother of the accused sitting by his side and his prattling children hanging upon the arm
of his chair. The other half of the picture is more difficult to
visualize, but the picture is there and consists not only of the
absent victim of the crime, dead, and with all of his aspirations
cut short by the actor, but also by that victim's sad-eyed and
white-haired mother and his prattling children playing about the
arm of a vacant chair. These pictures, in combination, portray
to "any one brought intimately into the personal and family
lives of individuals how much tragedy is brought to pass"-not
in the name of Justice, but in the living of life in our stage of
civilization. The damage cannot be eliminated by any judicial
act-certainly not by any particular treatment of the responsible actor-but agencies of government are continuously at work
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in an endeavor to remedy the evil as completely as possible for
those who innocently suffer from the situation.
Again the psychiatrist, with the actor before him for commiseration, continues:
"I am quite sure that I am right when I say the prisoner
who is sentenced at the bar of justice is a hypothetical individual. He is not an individual who has been sized up in
all of his parts, his assets as well as his liabilities dispassionately evaluated. .
.
If one really knew the personality of the average criminal, how pitifully inadequate it
was to cope with the situation in which he found himself
and how logical and understandable his conduct under all of
the circumstances of the situation really was, it would be
very difficult to get oneself into a state of mind that permitted the severity of punishment which the law often requires."
This is admirably expressed, but it is based upon the fallacy that
the ethical and legal responsibility for an act are identical. In
practice, that hypothetical individual presented by the prosecution to the jury is confronted by an equally hypothetical individual created by the defendant. In the former case, the hypothesis is based upon the actual words and deeds of the actor, while
in the latter it is based upon such parts of family history as the
actor is willing to reveal, together with his alleged reaction to the
environment in which he is found, as that environment is chosen
to be described by himself and his associates. To the situation
thus created, the law applies the rules hereinbefore quoted, and,
humanly speaking, society, for its own protection, can do little
more.
The purpose of this confusing of ethical and legal responsibility is clearly shown by the conclusions drawn and recommendations made, two of which, from the practical point of view, are
controlling. Dr. White, continuing, says:
"I believe fully in society's right to segregate the dangerous, anti-social types so long as they continue dangerous.
This means largely the doing away with fixed sentences, at
least for certain types of crime, and making the return to
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freedom conditioned upon some change in the individual that
gives one a right to suppose that perhaps he will function
more effectively as a social unit than he has in the past."
Naturally, if the above supposition proves to be unfounded, the
individual becomes a recidivist, and we again find him, as the
actor, in a criminal proceeding involving another study of the
"psychology of the individual," leading not to punishment but
to another segregation, until it is again supposed that perhaps
he will function more effectively.
And again:
"The discarding of the concept of responsibility. The
idea of responsibility is, as I have said, largely a metaphysical
one. Society must be protected from people who act antisocially. So far as possible this should be done without
raising metaphysical questions. How they should be cared
for is a matter depending on what sort of persons they
are and does not require a consideration of such abstruse
matters."
In other words, the character of the segregation, heretofore
noted, should vary in each particular case, should not depend
upon the nature of the crime, but be regulated solely by the result
of a study of the "psychology of the individual"-not by All
Wisdom, but by man, groping along uncertain, and often unknown, lines of investigation. That is dealing with a "hypothetical
individual"-earlier in the address strongly condemned-and
certainly partaking much of the "metaphysical."
The stability of human society requires that punishment for
crime be impersonal, certain and exact. This may be a heresy
of the legal profession, but it reaches far back into the spirit
of our institutions. It is this which the psychiatrist desires to
avoid. By insisting upon the "psychology of the individual"
as a controlling factor in the administration of the law, he requires that every sentence should rest upon a personal foundation. He inveighs against the idea of vengeance, but we must
remember that judges and juries are merely human, and he in-
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vites vengeance by the injection of the personal, psychic factor.
Under our law, the race, color, or condition of servitude (environment or otherwise) of the parents of the accused actor is of
no importance and quite immaterial. Under the proposed rule,
that condition becomes of prime importance and, as it may arouse
prejudice, is quite as likely to prompt vengeance as charity. Furthermore, even though the rule advocated may be applied without
the slightest prejudice in the mind of judge or jury, the necessary
result is to make punishment inexact and uncertain. It calls for
a consideration by men and women of what may be termed comparative responsibility (in the same sense as admiralty recognizes comparative negligence) as a necessary consequence, however much it may be asserted that the concept of responsibility
should be discarded. However phrased, it vests in the judge
and jury-also persons with an individual psychology, and each
with an heredity and environment-the weighing of non-responsibility in the balance with responsibility; the solution of psychic
problems, entirely distinct from the recognized conditions of
mental disease, involved in a mass of largely hearsay evidence
relating to heredity, history and environment, raising innumerable issues wholly disconnected with the commission of the criminal act. It would seem that the maximum and minimum sentences allowed by the law, the indeterminate sentence, and the
power of suspension in the case of first offenders vested sufficient discretion in the courts without attempting to endow our
judiciary with the attributes of Divinity.
It is also of importance to society that an element of guilt
should be attached, by way of stigma, to a voluntary breach of
the law. Without this stigma, the segregation of the actor may
be complete, but the path to pardon is far too easy. Although
neither medically nor legally insane, if an actor, having committed a criminal act, be absolved of that guild which involves
moral turpitude, as determined by an analysis of the "psychology
of the individual," because his father was a criminal and because
he was reared in an unhealthy environment, then the proposed
segregation is solely for educational and not for penal purposes.
Where segregation is merely for educational purposes, it is
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probable that some psychiatrists, upon a new analysis of the
"psychology of the individual," will conclude that the education
has been completed, that segregation should be terminated and
that the educated individual should be restored to society with
something in the nature of an academic degree of normalcy. Not
only might this occur, but it is what the psychiatrists contemplate
will happen, as clearly shown by the foregoing quotation to the
effect that segregation should continue so long as the individual
remains dangerous, and that the return to freedom should be
conditional upon some change that "gives one a right to. suppose
that perhaps" he will behave himself in the future.
It is the general experience of most of the states that the
Board of Pardons, or the Governor, is unduly charitable in
granting clemency to offenders under the law as it now is. Certainly, under the proposed plan, where the individual has been
held to be without moral guilt although he has committed shockingly criminal acts, and where his segregation has been not for
penal purposes, but conditioned upon some change resulting from
education-and the psychiatrists report that his education is complete-there would be every reason for it to be considered by the
Executive that the actor had successfully passed through his purgatory of education and should be restored to the Kingdom. The
basis for such a release is essentially different than it is in a case
under existing law where the actor has been found to be insane,
under presently accepted theories as judicially defined, and examining alienists report that he has been cured of his mental
disease.
The law is supposed to represent the accumulated wisdom
of the race in temporal affairs, and in the face of abortive prosecutions, scandalous acquittals, and sentimental pardons, it is insisted that the time has not yet arrived for the attempted
substitution of the methods of Divinity for the procedure adopted
by our race in testing what must be termed the responsibility of
criminals under the law. If criminals are to be permitted to
roam through society at will, confident that because of a bad
heredity and vicious environment they are secured against the
penalties of the law, and when convicted of crime they are, for
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that reason, to be absolved from guilt and merely placed in a
state-supported educational institute until a feigned reform
"gives one a right to suppose that perhaps" they are no longer
dangerous, and are to be then released to re-enact a drama of
crime, certainly our body politic is in a dangerously anemic condition and a liberal infusion should be made in some manner of
the good red blood of the common law, in the hope that a rejuvenated body may arouse and strengthen a dormant, if not actually
paretic, social mind. "Salus populi lex suprenza est."

